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INTRODUCTION

On September 13, 2007, the United Nations General Assembly
(GA) overwhelmingly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), which recognized, inter alia,
the rights of such peoples to "self-determination," "autonomy or selfgovernment," and the development or maintenance of "juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards."1 The Declaration is arguably the single most important development in the history of international law relating to indigenous
peoples.2 On the date of its passage in the GA, a statement issued by
the office of Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the UN, called it "a
triumph for indigenous peoples around the world" and noted that it
"mark[ed] a historic moment when UN Member States and indigenous peoples ... reconciled with their painful histories and ... resolved to move forward together
on the path of human rights, justice
3
and development for all.",
4
Like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
and other GA declarations addressing specific human rights con-

I

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, arts. 3, 4 & 34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter DRIP]
(emphasis added).
2 This assertion holds even given the nonbinding or "soft law" character of
the
Declaration and the parallel existence of binding multilateral treaties that deal, in
greater or smaller measure, with indigenous peoples. For example, International Labor Organization Convention 169-a binding treaty-protects rights for indigenous
peoples, but recognizes only very limited rights with regard to indigenous laws and customs. See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
3 Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, U.N.
Sec'y-Gen., Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Adoption of the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/
apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2733.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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cerns,5 the DRIP is generally considered an aspirational document
that broadly declares a set of rights and morally obligates all declaring
states to implement and enforce those rights. 6 And, like past human
rights declarations, the DRIP lays a foundation for the creation of future binding international law, expressed primarily through multilateral treaties based on the DRIP's principles and secondarily through
the development of customary international law.7 That said, the DRIP
is not, in and of itself, legally binding on states, and violations of the
rights declared therein are not necessarily judicially enforceable
against states in international courts."
5 See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A.
Res. 2263 (XXII), U.N. Doc. A/2263 (Nov. 7, 1967) [hereinafter DEDW]; Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), U.N.
Doc. A/1904 (Nov. 20, 1963) [hereinafter DERD]; Declaration of the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/1386 (Nov. 20, 1959) [hereinafter DRC].
6 Most international lawyers and scholars take this view of such
declarations. See
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 972 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992)
(noting that although they are not treaties, the UN declarations are "enunciat[ions of]
important principles").
7 Where enough states act in a certain way (i.e., state
practice) with the sense that
they are legally obligated to do so (i.e., opiniojuris), that state practice develops into
customary international law, which is binding on all states. The DRIP could advance
the development of customary international law related to indigenous peoples' rights
if states implement-or begin to implement-its principles through state practice supported by opiniojuris.
8 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 6, at 972 ("The
prevailing opinion is that [UN declarations] do not as such have binding force, since
the [GA] does not have the power to make decisions of this kind binding. Such declarations can, however, be wholly or in part an expression of existing rules or principles
of international law. Moreover, as evidence of emerging new convictions and as a reflection of the practice of States adopting these declarations, they can influence the
development of new norms of international law, either as general principles of law or
as rules of customary international law.").
While the prevailing view of such declarations is indeed that they are not legally
binding per se, it is worth noting that New Zealand, one of the four states to oppose
the DRIP, thought otherwise:

The Declaration is explained by its supporters as being an aspirational document intended to inspire rather than to have legal effect. New Zealand does
not, however, accept that a State can responsibly take such a stance towards a
document that purports to declare the contents of the rights of indigenous
people. We take the statements in the Declaration very seriously. For that reason we have felt compelled to take the position that we do.
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 14-15, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13,
2007) (statement of Ambassador Rosemary Banks, Permanent Representative of New
Zealand). The apparent view of New Zealand would seem to accord with an argument
advanced by some that state practice is no longer essential to the formation of customary international law, and that opiniojuris, as expressed in nonbinding declarations, is
enough to crystallize "instantaneously" binding customary law. Bin Cheng, Custom:
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Because of the DRIP's presumptively nonbinding character, its enforcement is largely, if not exclusively, dependent on its voluntary acceptance and implementation by UN member states. In this sense,
the overwhelming international support for the DRIP-by 143
states 9-suggests
that it may be used, in the words of Mr. Ban, "to urgently advance the work of integrating the rights of indigenous peoples into international human rights and development agendas ...so
as to ensure that the vision behind the Declaration becomes a reality.,,10

Unlike some other UN human rights declarations-but, ironically,
not unlike the watershed UDHR-the DRIP did not enjoy universal
support." Four states voted against it: Australia, Canada, New ZeaThe Future of GeneralState Practicein a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 532
(R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M.Johnston eds., 1983).
The total vote count was 143 states for and 4 against, with 11 abstentions.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States opposed the passage of the DRIP,
while Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria,
Russia, Samoa, and the Ukraine abstained. U.N. GAOR, supra note 8, at 18-19. A few
abstaining states justified their abstentions using reasons similar to those offered by the
states voting against it. For example, Russia said that the DRIP was not "a truly balanced document" and did not "enjoy consensus support," id. at 16, while Colombia,
like New Zealand, contended that "some aspects of the Declaration [were] in direct
contradiction with the Colombian internal legal system," including provisions of Articles 19, 30, and 32. Id. at 17-18.
While both the opposing and abstaining votes detracted from universal acceptance
of the DRIP (as "universal" is defined infta note 11), this Comment focuses only on
responding to the arguments advanced by the four states actively voting against the
DRIP-in part to emphasize that the DRIP's goals can best be fulfilled if states stop actively opposing it. Nevertheless, the analysis presented here is also largely responsive
to many of the concerns of abstaining states.
10 Press Release, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., supra note 3.
I use "universal" to mean either favorable votes by all parties
eligible to vote
(i.e., member states) or adoption without a vote, signaling full support of member
states. Thus, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
the Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child all enjoyed universal support in the sense that they passed
unanimously. See 1967 U.N.Y.B. 514, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I.1; 1963 U.N.Y.B. 330, U.N.
Sales No. 64.1.1; 1959 U.N.Y.B. 192, U.N. Sales No. 60.1.1. Likewise, the Declaration on
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, were adopted without vote and hence universally supported. See 1992 U.N.Y.B. 722, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.1; 1981 U.N.Y.B. 879,
U.N. Sales. No. E.84.1.1.
However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not enjoy universal support-eight states, including the former Soviet Union and South Africa, abstained. See
U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 933, U.N. Doc. A/PV.183 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(noting forty-eight states voting for the UDHR, and abstentions by eight: the Byelorus-
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land, and the United States. 2 While Canada's long-standing support
for the DRIP only waned after the rise of a new government in 2006,13
the opposition of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to the
approved text has been more consistent. 14 In addition, Canada's
stated reasons for opposing the DRIP appear to be somewhat distinct
from those expressed by the latter three.'5 Noting "significant concerns with respect to the wording of the [adopted] text," Canada's
Ambassador to the UN, John McNee, focused on three specific areas
when speaking to the GA on September 13, 2007: "the provisions on
lands, territories and resources;" the provisions on "free, prior and informed consent when used as a veto;" and "dissatisfaction with the
,, 16
process.

sian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia). In addition, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence for Colonial
Countries and Peoples (the Colonial Peoples' Declaration), G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N.
Doc A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960), was not universally supported, as nine states abstained.
See U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg. at 1273-74, U.N. Doc. A/PV.947 (Dec. 14,
1960) (noting eighty-nine states voting for and abstentions by nine states: Australia,
Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). Despite its lack of "universal" support, however, the
UDHR is nevertheless considered the foundational document of the modern human
rights system, and colonialism per se has become indefensible foreign policy and a violation of the right to external self-determination. See infra Part..B.2 (comparing external and internal self-determination).
12 See supra note 9.
3 On January 23, 2006, the Conservative
Party of Canada won a plurality of the
seats in Parliament, creating the proportionally smallest minority government since
Confederation in 1867. See Elections Canada, 39th General Election: Official Results
(Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.elections.ca/scripts/OVR2006/25/map.pdf.
The next
year, Canada's UN representative commented that although his government sought a
"document that would advance indigenous rights and promote harmonious arrangements between indigenous peoples and the States in which they live," it voted against
the DRIP because the final text "did not address some of [its] concerns." U.N. GAOR,
supra note 8, at 12 (statement of Ambassador John McNee, Permanent Representative
of Canada).
:4 See infra text accompanying notes 17-19.
Note, however, that New Zealand's ultimate reasons for voting against
the DRIP
are more like those of Canada than those of Australia and the United States. See infra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
16 U.N. GAOR, supra note 8, at 12 (statement of AmbassadorJohn
McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada). In addition to those three concerns, Mr. McNee also
mentioned without elaboration concerns about the provisions "on self-government
without recognition of the importance of negotiations; on intellectual property; on
military issues; and on the need to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights
and obligations of indigenous peoples, Member States and third parties." Id. at 12-13.
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By contrast, in a joint statement made on October 16, 2006, after
the adoption of the draft DRIP by the Human Rights Council, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States focused on a more fundamental concern with the DRIP: self-determination." These states called
the draft DRIP text "confusing, unworkable, contradictory and deeply
flawed" and asserted that the right of self-determination, declared in
Article 3, "could be misrepresented as conferring a unilateral right of
self-determination and possible secession upon a specific subset of the
national populace, thus threatening the political unity, territorial integrity and the stability of existing UN Member States. " "' Other concerns raised in the joint statement seem to stem from this central
worry that unilateral self-determination could lead to secession.19
The final version of the DRIP adopted by the GA contains a provision, Article 46(1), that specifically forecloses the possibility of such a
broad misrepresentation of the conferred self-determination right:
"Nothing in this Declaration may be ... construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States."20 Given Article 46(1) and the general disfavor with

See Press Release, U.S. Mission to the UN, Statement by H.E. Ambassador
Rosemary Banks, on Behalf of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, on Item
64(a) The Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, in the Third
Committee of the 61st UN General Assembly (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://
www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press-releases/20061016294.html.
17

18

Id.

19

The joint statement also addressed concerns similar to those raised by Canada-

specifically regarding provisions dealing with land and resources-as well as concerns
about some provisions being "potentially discriminatory" and concerns about the lack
of a definition of "indigenous peoples." See id. Nevertheless, the overall focus of the
statement was clearly the consequences of conferring a self-determination right on indigenous peoples. Indeed, the concern about leaving "indigenous peoples" undefined
was explicitly rooted in the overarching self-determination worry: "The lack of definition ... means that separatist or minority groups, with traditional connections to the
territory where they live[,] ... could seek to exploit this declaration to claim the right
Id. To be clear, however, it is not the position of this Comto self-determination ....
ment that the other reasons provided by the opposing states are not important to their
continued opposition, or even that those reasons are entirely without merit. Rather, in
arguing that the opposing states, especially the United States and Australia, cannot legitimately rely on fears about self-determination (as they have defined and used the
term) in opposing the DRIP, this Comment attempts to encourage a candid debate
about the real issues of discord-issues that fundamentally come down to unstated disagreements over the meaning of "internal self-determination" (the right conferred by
the DRIP) to the extent that such a fight implies rights to autonomous governance and
control over lands and resources.
20 DRIP, supranote 1, art. 46(1).
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which international law views the recognition of newly formed states,
any worry about the DRIP being used in an even marginally effective
way to invoke "secession" rights seems extreme at best. However,
other rights implied by self-determination-those short of secession
and not otherwise threatening the territorial integrity or political
unity of states-are arguably still unilaterally conferred on indigenous
peoples.
Perhaps due to the inclusion of Article 46(1) in the final version
of the DRIP, New Zealand did not invoke self-determination concerns
in explaining its continued opposition to the Declaration on September 13. Rather, it stated that it "fully support[ed] the principles and
aspirations" of the DRIP; noting the incompatibility of four specific
provisions in the text with its constitution and laws, it also justified its
"no" vote based on its view that the DRIP is more than an aspirational
document and has, in itself, binding "legal effect 2 1 (a view contrary to
that of most states, including the United States). As such, it seemed to
believe that it would be legally bound under international law to guarantee rights (e.g., land rights and informed consent rights) that it
found incompatible with its domestic law.22
Unlike New Zealand, and despite the addition of Article 46(1),
Australia and the United States continued, in explaining their votes
against the DRIP, to invoke opposition to the Article 3 self-determination right. Noting that it has "long expressed its dissatisfaction with the
references to self-determination in the declaration," Australia proceeded to define self-determination as limited to two scenarios, both
of which it believed were inapposite to indigenous peoples: "decolonization and the break-up of States into smaller States with clearly defined population groups"; and situations "where a particular group
within a defined territory is disenfranchised and is denied political or
civil rights." 23 Australia further asserted that self-determination is "not
a right that attaches to an undefined subgroup of a population seeking to obtain political independence." 24 Seemingly ignoring the pres-

21

U.N. GAOR, supra note 8, at 14-15 (statement of Ambassador Rosemary Banks,

Permanent Representative of New Zealand). New Zealand specifically remained opposed to "article 26 on lands and resources, article 28 on redress, and articles 19 and
32 on a right of veto over the State." Id. at 14. New Zealand also mentioned in passing
its opposition to Article 31, which relates to intellectual property rights. Id.
See supra note 8.
23 U.N. GAOR, supra note 8, at 11 (statement of Ambassador
Robert Hill, Permanent Representative of Australia).
24

, ,
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ence and function of Article 46(1), though mimicking its language,
Australia concluded its discussion of self-determination by stating that
it "does not support a concept that could be construed as encouraging
action that would impair, even in part, the territorial and political integrity 5of a State with a system of democratic representative Govern, 1
ment.
For its part, the United States' analysis of Article 3 self-determination in opposing the DRIP was more subtle, though apparently just as
central to its thinking. In continuing to call the DRIP "confusing" and
"flawed," the United States noted that the right to self-determination
is addressed in Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2 6 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),27 where it is "understood by some to28include the right to full independence under certain circumstances."

While acknowledging earlier in its explanation that "[u] nder [its]
domestic law, the United States government recognizes Indian tribes
as political entities with inherent powers of self-government as first peoples"
and that the "federal government has a government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes,",29 the United States asserted that "[u]nder
existing Common Article 1 legal obligations, indigenous peoples gen-

Id.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
27 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
28 Press Release, U.S. Mission to the UN, Explanation of Vote by Robert Hagen,
U.S. Advisor, on the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to the UN General Assembly (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/
press_releases/20070913_204.html. This characterization of the Common Article I
right to self-determination is somewhat misleading. The understanding that the right
carries with it a right to "full independence under certain circumstances" (e.g., classic
colonialism) is held by more than "some." Indeed, this understanding is held by the
vast majority of international legal scholars and has almost certainly crystallized into a
binding customary international norm through state practice with opinio juris. See
25

26

LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:

CASES AND MATERIALS 268-69

(4th ed. 2001) (noting that self-determination has been "accepted as a principle of
customary as well as treaty law" and that it was classically "understood... as a right of
the people in non-self-governing territories (i.e., colonies) freely to determine their
political status"). This "full independence" scenario presumably comports with the
first of Australia's two defined scenarios. See supra text accompanying note 23.
29 Press Release, U.S. Mission to the UN, supra note 28
(emphasis added).
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erally are not entitled to independence nor any right of self-government
within the nation-state."30
The United States declared that the mandate of the Working
Group on the DRIP, which had been created by the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) in accordance with a GA resolution," was
not "to qualify, limit, or expand" the Common Article 1 obligations
legally binding on states with regard to self-determination rights, but
rather "to articulate a new concept, i.e., self-government within the
nation-state." 32 Noting that this "self-government" concept is "not the
same concept as the right contained in [C]ommon Article 1," the
United States concluded that it was "wholly inappropriate ...[to] reproduc[e] [C]ommon Article 1 in Article 3 of the text with no intention that Article 3 mean the same thing as [C]ommon Article 1, nor
that it be considered to explain or modify the scope of existing
[C]ommon Article 1 legal obligations." 33 Because the United States
considered the "most significant provisions" of the DRIP, Article 3
foremost among them, "fundamental to interpreting all of the
[DRIP's] provisions," it concluded
that "the text as a whole is rendered
3 4
unworkable and unacceptable."

30
31

Id. (emphasis added).
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/RES/

1995/32 (July 25, 1995).
32 Press Release, U.S. Mission to the
UN, supra note 28.
33 Id. Note that while it may indeed be the case that
the mandate (and power) of
the Working Group did not extend to qualifying, limiting, or expanding self-determination rights, as that term is used in Common Article 1, this does not mean that the
mandate of the Working Group did not include the articulation of aspirational selfdetermination rights as specifically applied to "indigenous peoples." Thus, there
would be (1) self-determination as legally binding on states party to the ICCPR and
ICESCR, and (2) self-determination in the specific context of indigenous peoples, as
aspired to by the DRIP. The argument that the mandate of the Working Group included the articulation of self-determination rights is conclusively supported by the
very wording of the mandate itself. In its Resolution 1995/32, ECOSOC specifically
stated that it was creating the Working Group for "the sole purpose of elaborating a
draft declaration, considering the draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples annexed to resolution 1994/45 of 26 August 1994 of the Subcommission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities ... " ECOSOC Res.
1995/32, supra note 31,
2 (emphasis added). The draft referred to by ECOSOC,
which was the only draft the Working Group was required to consider, contained an
Article 3 self-determination right that was identical to that in the final draft of the
DRIP approved by the GA on September 13. See E. Res. 1994/45, Annex, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/199/2, art. 3 (Aug. 26, 1994) ("Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
34 Press Release, U.S. Mission to the UN, supra note
28 (emphasis added).
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This Comment makes two arguments, one broad and one narrow.
Broadly, it argues that concerns of the United States and others about
the "workability" of the DRIP-at least regarding self-determinationare misplaced, and that the meaning of self-determination is clearly
delimited, not merely by Article 46(1), but by the substantive rights
conferred in the DRIP. The Comment argues that the appropriate
way to understand the DRIP's self-determination provisions involves a
two-stage process, moving first from the skeletal right conferred in Article 3 to the more substantive Article 4, and then to specific features
of the right conferred in subsequent provisions. This broader argument is woven through a more narrowly focused argument that examines the applicability of a single provision in the DRIP-Article 34,
which confers rights to 'Juridical systems"-to "egalitarian juridical
pluralism" (EJP), the emerging recognition of the exclusive jurisdiction of indigenous courts. On this score, the Comment argues that
EJP is an appropriate exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 34.
By examining the applicability of EJP to Article 34, this Comment
seeks to shed light not only on the meaning and workability of Article
34, but also on the content and functionality of the overarching right
of self-determination conferred in Article 3. As the United States has
asserted, this right is "fundamental" "to interpreting all of the provisions" in the DRIP.3'
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of international law
relating to self-determination, to provide context for an analysis of the
rights conferred by Article 34, in conjunction with Articles 3 and 4.
Part II presents an argument for a two-stage process in reading meaning into "self-determination" as the term is used in the DRIP. Part III
then uses the emerging concept of EJP as a test case for fleshing out
the rights conferred under the DRIP, and then more broadly assesses
the workability of self-determination under the DRIP, paying particular attention to the concerns raised by Australia and the United States.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELF-DETERMINATION,
AND MINORITY RIGHTS

To better understand the meaning of "self-determination"
DRIP and the significance of the growing movement toward
states with large indigenous populations, it is first necessary to
the historical development and treatment of self-determination

Id.

in the
EJP in
review
under
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international law. This Part begins by providing a general overview of
international human fights law and then proceeds with a review of the
concept of "self-determination," paying particular attention to its roots
in concern for minority rights. It then discusses the important distinction between "internal" and "external" self-determination.
A. Overview of InternationalHuman Rights
As mentioned in the Introduction, the passage of the UDHR in
1948 was a watershed moment in international law, signaling the beginning of the modern concept of human rights.3 6 Before the UDHRand before the Holocaust,
which provided the political impetus to
37
create and pass it -international law was almost entirely state centered.38 That is, international law only concerned itself with the actions of states in relation to other states (actions inter nations).39 If
state A massacred both its own citizens and the citizens of state B, state
A's offense would legally be against the sovereignty of state B, and the
individual victims could not, by themselves, hold state A accountable.
Only if state B chose to take offense at the violation of its sovereignty
could state A potentially be held accountable under international law
for its actions against B's citizens. 40 The situation for A's own citizens
was far worse. Under traditional state-centered international law, state

See HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS, MORALS 138-39 (2d ed. 2000). "Despite proposals to the contrary, the [UN] Charter stopped shy of incorporating a bill of rights," prompting the
establishment of a commission to draft the UDHR, which was adopted by the GA in
1948. Id. Between 1948 and 1976, when ICCPR and ICESCR entered into force, the
UDHR was "broadly known and frequently invoked [because] ... it was the only broadbased human rights instrument available." Id. For a more detailed analysis of the
drafting history of the UDHR, see generally JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DEG
LARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFrING, AND INTENT (1999).
37 Seegenerally MORSINK, supra note 36, at 36-91.
38 See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61
(1950) (noting that "international practice did not, until recently, accept the implications of [the]
view" that the individual is "a subject of international law").
39 See generally id. at 67-69.
40 In such a scenario, B would be exercising "diplomatic protection" on behalf of
its citizens, and under the traditional system, it would base its claim not on a violation
of its citizens' human rights, but on a violation of its own sovereign dignity. In any
case, any satisfaction it received (e.g., an apology or money damages) would belong to
the state and not to the victims. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr.
Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, at 7 (Aug. 30) ("By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person
of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.").
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A could do whatever it wanted with its own citizens-from torturing
them to engaging in genocide-without breaking international law.41
After the Holocaust and the UDHR introduced the welfare of the
individual human being as an object of international concern, the
state-centered concept of international law faced significant challenges. The UDHR, like the DRIP, was "only" a declaration, yet it carried with it a force that has fundamentally altered the way the world
thinks about international law.42 It stated a set of basic rights that all
individuals have by virtue of being human, including rights to "life,
liberty, and the security of person," a series of basic due process rights,
and a series of economic rights. 43 All of these rights, with the possible
exception of the right to own property "in association with others,""
were individual rather than collective rights. Though they were aimed
in large measure at preventing atrocities like the Holocaust, which
45
were committed against a collective group, the rights themselves
were conferred on individuals, not on "peoples" or other groups.
The principles in the UDHR formed the basis for the creation of
two foundational human rights treaties: the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
These two treaties effectively bifurcated the rights contained in the
UDHR, each elaborating on and giving legal force to the rights contained within its sphere. Compliance with the rights contained in
these treaties is obligatory for states that are parties to them. Enforcement, however, is still largely subject to self-monitoring by states
and the realpolitik of international relations. This remains true even
though one of two optional protocols to the ICCPR broadens the

41

See Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw: Politics, Values and Functions, in 4 RECUEIL

DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 13,
209 (1989) ("[Flor hundreds of years international law and the law governing individual life did not come together.... What a State did inside its borders in relation to its
own nationals remained its own affair, an element of its autonomy, a matter of its 'domesticjurisdiction."').
42 See HenryJ. Steiner, Securing Human Rights: The
First Half-Century of the Universal
Declaration, and Beyond, HARV. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 45 ("[The UDHR] has retained its place of honor in the human rights movement. No other document has so
caught the historical moment, achieved the same moral and rhetorical force, or exerted as much influence on the movement as a whole.... [It has] forever chang[ed]
the discourse of international relations on issues vital to human decency and peace.").
43 See UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 3, 5-12,
22-26.
44 See id. art.
17.
45 See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
46 See Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2006) (noting the "significanty limited enforcement capacity"
of the international human rights system).
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scope of international monitoring and enforcement of human ights
violations, including the acceptance of complaints by individual victims. 47 Together with the UDHR, the ICCPR (along with its optional
protocols) and the ICESCR
are known collectively as the International
48
Bill of Human Rights.
B. Self-Determination and Minority Rights in InternationalLaw
Like the UDHR, the ICCPR and ICESCR generally state a series of
individual rights. However, there is one glaring exception in both
treaties: Common Article 1, which states that "[a] 11 peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status 49and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
47 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 2, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
("[I]ndividuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have
been violated ... may submit a written communication to the [Human Rights] Committee for consideration."). The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which the
United States has not signed, deals with abolition of the death penalty. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
44/128, Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128/Annex (Dec. 15, 1989) ("Each State
Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction.").
48 UN Office of the High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1),
The International Bill of Human Rights (1996), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/
2/fs2.htm. Note that in addition to the International Bill of Human Rights, there are a
number of important topical human rights treaties, some of which are explored later
in this Comment as they relate to indigenous peoples' rights. See, e.g., International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990);
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signatureMar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211.
49 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 1(1) (emphasis
added); ICESCR, supra note 27, art.
1 (1) (emphasis added). In addition to the above-quoted text, Article 1 (2) also states,
in paragraph 2, that

[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 1 (2); ICESCR, supra note 27, art. 1 (2). Paragraph 3 creates
a binding obligation on states to promote self-determination in colonies and their ilk:
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Accruing to "peoples," the right to self-determination suggests on
its face a collective ("they freely determine") rather than an individual
character. Though not included in the UDHR, the concept of selfdetermination also appears in the 1945 UN Charter, where it is used
in connection with one of the purposes of the United Nations: "[tlo
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." 50
But, to understand the use of self-determination in the UN Charter
and the International Bill of Human Rights, it is worth briefly tracing
the origins of self-determination in international law, noting its close
relationship with concerns for the rights of ethnic, religious, and
other minorities.
1. The Roots of Self-Determination and Minority Rights
The roots of the concept of self-determination go back to the 1776
American Declaration of Independence and the 1789 French Revolution, which directly challenged the then-prevailing notion that "individuals and peoples, as subjects of the King, were objects to be [used]
...in accordance with the interests of the monarch." 51 The historical
root of self-determination is the notion that the government of a state
must be responsible to the "people." 2
During and after the First World War, the concept of self-determination exploded onto the international scene,13 when it was invoked
most famously-to Western minds at least-by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in connection with his Fourteen Points. 54 Wilson primarily
"[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for
the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." ICCPR, supra note 26, art.
1 (3); ICESCR, supra note 27, art. 1 (3).
50 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
51 ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL
11

(1995).
52

Id.

See id. at 13 (noting that for President Wilson, self-determination "was the key to
lasting peace in Europe," while for V.I. Lenin, "it was a means of realizing the dream of
0

worldwide socialism").

The Fourteen Points, Wilson's general principles for building a post-war international system, are reprinted in WILSON'S IDEALS 112-15 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1942).
For an excellent historical account of the formation of the League of Nations, including significant treatment of the use of the concept of self-determination, see generally
MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: Six MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2001).
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intended self-determination as a democratic principle of the right of
people to choose their own government, 55 but not to secede from existing states or to decolonize, though he occasionally stated it in
broader terms:
The fundamental principle of [self-determination] is a principle ...
never acknowledged before ... : that the countries of the world belong
to the people who live in them, and that they have a right to determine
their own destiny and their own form of government .... and that no
body of statesmen, sitting anywhere, ... has the right to assign
any great
5
people to a sovereignty under which it does not care to live.

Despite rhetorical invocation by some of broad self-determination
rights to secede, 57 international law-and states, as both the legislators
and the subjects of international law-initially remained closed to the
idea. In 1920, for instance, the Council of the League of Nations appointed a Committee of Jurists to decide if the people of the Aaland
Islands had a right to secede from Finland and join Sweden. 5s The
report issued by the Committee clearly decided that "Positive International Law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such, to
separate themselves from the State of which they form part." 59 Aaland
Islands went on to state that "[g] enerally speaking, the grant or refusal
of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate ... is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of [the]
State." 60 Thus, Aaland Islands is generally cited for the proposition

See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 19-21 (describing Wilson's conception of selfdetermination as containing four "variants": (1) the right of people to choose their
"form of government"; (2) a means of "restructuring... the states of central Europe in
accordance with national desires"; (3) a "criterion governing territorial change" (that
is, taking the interests of populations into account when states divide up territory); and
(4) a factor, but not a decisive one, in settling claims of colonies to independence).
56Woodrow Wilson, Speech at Billings, Montana (Sept. 11, 1919), in WILSON'S
IDEALS, supra note 54, at 109.
57 This view was expressed most famously by V.I. Lenin. See supra note
53 and accompanying text.
For an in-depth historical review of the Aaland Islands case, see generally JAMES
BARROS, THE ALAND ISLANDS QUESTION: ITS SETTLEMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1968).
59 Report of the InternationalCommittee ofJurists Entrusted by the
Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 5 (Special Supp. No. 3, 1920) [hereinafter
Aaland Islands].
60 Id. (emphasis added). Note that despite deciding that national groups did not
have a right to self-determination that outweighed state sovereignty, the Aaland Islands
opinion did decide that the League of Nations could appropriately take action on the
case without infringing state sovereignty because Finland was not a "definitely consti55
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that in 1920 the right of self-determination was not guaranteed under
61
positive international law.
However, in addition to rejecting a unilateral right to secede and
affirming a strong concept of state sovereignty, Aaland Islands did
something else: it recognized a fundamental connection between the
principle of self-determination and the then-emerging principle of
"protection of minorities. " " According to the Commission, "both
have a common object-to assure to some national Group the maintenance and63 free development of its social, ethnical or religious characteristics."

As such, Aaland Islands stated that the principle of self-determination "must be brought into line with that of the protection of minorities." 64 The Commission noted that "international legal concept[s]"
and "the interests of peace" might "dictate" an "extensive grant of liberty to minorities" as a compromise where "geographical, economic
and other similar considerations" may preclude the exercise of the
right of self-determination in its most extreme form-secession or
65
transfer to another state.
In the end, the question of independence
for the Aaland Islanders was resolved in just such a fashion, though
not on the basis of international legal right; rather, in a bilateral
agreement between Finland and Sweden, the66 Aaland Islanders were
given a significant measure of local autonomy.
2. The Modern Standard: External and Internal Self-Determination
In 1945, at the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), there was debate over the meaning of the term
"self-determination" being included in the UN Charter. Arguments
that in some ways mirrored those advanced by the United States and
Australia in opposition to the DRIP were advanced against inclusion

tuted State" (having recently become independent from Russia). Id. at 14. This resulted in an agreement between Finland and Sweden giving the Aaland Islanders a degree of autonomous local government. See Minutes of the Thirteenth Session of the
Council of the League of Nations, in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 701-02 (1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Agreement] (providing the text of the agreement); CASSESE,
supra note 51, at 27-33 (discussing the use of the principle of self-determination to
grant autonomy to the Aaland Islanders).
61 CASSESE, supra note 51, at 29-30.
62 Id.
63 Aaland Islands, supranote

59, at 6.

&4Id.
65

Id.

66 SeeAaland

Islands Agreement, supra note 60, at 701-02.
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of the term. 67 In response to arguments that a right of self-determination would encourage secession by national minorities and lead to
"international anarchy," the Committee charged with drafting Article
1(2) of the Charter-which dealt with the purposes of the United Nations-confirmed that the right "implied the right of self-government of
peoples and not the right of secession."' However, while states were
clear that self-determination, as used in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, did not imply minority secession rights or, indeed, the right of
colonies to complete independence, they were less clear on what exactly it did mean. 69 In any case, the immediate legal obligations
placed on states with regard to self-determination under the Charter
were minimal and thus palatable. 70
During the years after passage of the UN Charter, self-determination took on a meaning that was entirely unexpected for some: in direct contradiction to the understanding expressed by the UNCIO
Committee, many countries, mostly socialist or developing nations,
began to strongly advocate a view of self-determination as a right to
colonial independence. 7' The focus of these countries was on the
right to "external" self-determination, or the right to secede and form
a new state or join a different state.72 Western states, including the
United States, responded by arguing that the UN Charter clearly contemplated only "internal" self-determination: the U.S. delegate to

67

For example, the Belgian representative to the UNCIO argued that Article 1(2)

of the draft UN Charter, which dealt with "self-determination," was based on "confusion." He further averred that it was "dangerous" and might lead to its invocation by
national minorities for secessionist purposes. Belgian DelegationAmendment to Paragraph
2 of ChapterI, in 6 U.N. INFO. ORG., DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN SAN FRANCISCO 300 (1945).

Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 42 ("States were unable positively to define selfdetermination.").
70 See U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56 (generally requiring states
to take 'joint and separate action" to advance the purposes of the UN with regard to economic development,
human rights, and other concerns); CASSESE, supra note 51, at 43 ("[T]he Charter did
not impose direct and immediate legal obligationson Member States ....
").
71 See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 44 (claiming that these
groups were the predominant advocates of the anticolonial theory). This view of self-determination had previously been articulated by V.I. Lenin, around the same time that President Wilson articulated his views of the concept. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also G.
STARUSHENKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOVIET FOREIGN

POLICY 6-10 (lvanov Mumjiev trans. 1964).
72 See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 45-46 (discussing the rhetorical battle between
states advocating for external self-determination and those advocating for internal selfdetermination).
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ECOSOC argued that self-determination simply meant the "proand was granted universally, not merely
mot[ion] of self-government"
3
peoples.
to colonial
In 1966, the ICCPR and ICESCR were opened for signature. Included among their conferred rights, as discussed earlier, was the Arpeoples." 74
ticle 1 collective "right of self-determination" for "[a]ll
During drafting, Western countries fought the inclusion of the collective right to self-determination in both the ICCPR and the ICESCR,
arguing that these foundational human rights treaties were focused
on individual and not collective rights.7 5 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, along with many developing countries, strongly supported includ76
The right contained in
ing the right on anticolonialist principles.
Common Article 1 has been interpreted as containing rights to both
"internal" and "external" self-determination, though the focus of the
UN Human Rights Committee, which is charged with monitoring
states' compliance with international human rights norms, 7 has historically been on the latter.78

73

Isador Lubin, U.S. Views on Self-Determination, 27 DEP'T ST. BULL. 269, 269, 271

(1952) (reprinting the statement of the U.S. representative to the UN Economic and
Social Council).
74 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 1(1); ICESCR, supra note 27, art. 1(1); see also supra
note 50 and accompanying text (reproducing the relevant text of Article 1).
75 CASSESE, supra note
51, at 47.
76 Id.; see also Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination
of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 92 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981).
77 See DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE
IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
247-50 (1991).
78 The emphasis on external self-determination is probably rooted
in the international law principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of states that is embodied in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (withholding authority from the UN "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state"). The Human Rights Committee emphasized this point in a
1984 report specifically addressing Common Article 1. See U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee 143, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984) ("[AIII
States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate realization of and
respect for the right of peoples to self-determination .... [However,] States must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other States and thereby adversely affecting the exercise of the right to self-determination."); see also CASSESE, supra note 51,
at 62-63 (noting that historically, the Committee has "primarily emphasized the external
dimension of self-determination... [and] that contracting States were debarred by the
principle of non-interference from inquiring as to whether internal self-determination
was being implemented in other States").
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The concept of external self-determination has always been tied to
the movement for colonial independence. Heavily influenced by the
1960 UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the Colonial Peoples' Declaration), which, like the
DRIP, reproduced Common Article 1(1) verbatim, 79 the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) authoritatively laid down the rule of external
self-determination for colonial peoples in two opinions: the Advisory
Opinion on Namibia and the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara."'
The Namibia and Western Saharacases clearly affirmed the right of
colonial peoples to self-determination,
as declared in the Colonial
Peoples' Declaration.
Del r to 2. More
o eiinteresting
t r si gfforrou
our purposes,
u p s s however,
o e e ,iis
what these cases (and international practice) confirm about the scope
of the right to self-determination as it is applied to colonies. Despite
using language identical to that of Common Article 1 (1) of the ICCPR
and ICESCR, the right declared in the Colonial Peoples' Declaration
concerns only "external self-determination" and expires once it has
been exercised, either by the choice to form a new state or to associate
3
or integrate with an existing state.

Colonial Peoples' Declaration, supra note 11. In both
the Colonial Peoples'
Declaration and the DRIP, reproduction of Common Article I extends only to its first
paragraph, which declares the right of self-determination for all peoples. The second
paragraph--declaring the right of all peoples to "freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources"-is not included. Compare id. andDRIP, supra note 1, with ICCPR, supra
note 26, art. 1(1), and ICESCR, supra note 27, art. 1(1).
80 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Namibia), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.CJ. 16 (June 21).
81 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J.
12 (Oct. 16).
82 See id. at 32 (declaring that paragraph 2 of
the Colonial Peoples' Declaration
"confirm[s] and emphasize[s] that the application of the right of self-determination
requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned"); Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 31 ("[T]he subsequent development of international law in regard
to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them.").
83 See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 31, 30 (declaring
that "[t]he principle of selfdetermination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of bringing all
colonial situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in [the Colonial Peoples' Declaration]," and that the Declaration was "a system of decolonization based on the [principle of] self-determination"); Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 31 (noting that there is "little doubt
that the ultimate objective ... was the self-determination and independence of the
peoples concerned"); CASSESE, supra note 51, at 72-73 (noting that the right of selfdetermination as applied to colonial peoples "only concerns external self-determination, that is, the choice of the international status of the people and the territory where
it lives," and that "once a people has exercised its right to external self-determination,
the right expires").
79
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The contours of the Article 1 right to internal self-determination
right to self-government rooted in the Wilsonian conception-

have been defined with reference to the specific political rights conferred by other substantive provisions of the ICCPR. s 4 In other words,
internal self-determination has generally been interpreted as the right
to have the essential political rights conferred by the ICCPR protected, as a proxy for the existence of genuine self-government. In
sharp contrast to the right to external self-determination for colonial
peoples, the right to internal self-determination is a continuous
right. 5 The right can be conceptualized as applying to three demographics within a state: (1) the whole population; (2) racial or religious minorities suffcring gross discrimination;
and (3) ethnic groups,
86
indigenous peoples, and other minorities.
The first scenario-the right of self-government for the whole
population of a state-has traditionally been underdeveloped in international law due to the strong emphasis on noninterference in
states' domestic affairs.87 The third scenario, which will form an essential aspect of our inquiry below, has also been historically disfa-

84

For example, the United Kingdom has declared to the GA that internal self-

determination
requires that [peoples] should be enabled to exercise other rights [conferred
in the ICCPR and ICESR] . .. , such as the rights to freedom of thought and
expression; the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; the
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, either directly or through
freely chosen representatives; and the right to vote and be elected at genuine
periodic elections.
55 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 432 (1984). The United States has similarly declared that
"[f]reedom of choice is indispensable to the exercise of the right of self-determination.
For this freedom of choice to be meaningful, there must be corresponding freedom of
thought, conscience, expression, movement and association." Subjects of International Law, 1974 DIGEST § 5, at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CASSESE,
supra note 51, at 53 ("[I]n order to understand the exact parameters of internal selfdetermination one must refer to the other provisions of the [ICCPRI.").
85 See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 101 ("[T]he right to internal
self-determination is
neither destroyed nor diminished by its having already once been invoked and put
into effect.").
86 Id. at 102.
87 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. However, some scholars have
argued
that recent practice suggests an emerging customary right to internal self-determination-or a right to democracy-for states' entire populations. See, e.g., Thomas M.
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); AnneMarie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 511
(1995).

2008]

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' COURTS

1361

vored, generally because of concerns about unfettered secession
rights.8
In contrast, the second scenario has been more explicitly developed. In the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the GA set forth a
series of governing principles, one of which was entitled the "principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."8 9 The strong relationship between minority rights and self-determination-highlighted
in the Aaland Islands caseg°-is again apparent in the Declaration's title. The Declaration stated that "subjection of peoples to. . . exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle," 9' and, while focused primarily on external self-determination, it included a savings clause that
looks somewhat like Article 46(1) of the DRIP:"
Nothing in the [Declaration] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ...

and thus possessed

of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. ' 3

See generally LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 27-31 (1978).
89G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/8082/Annex (Oct.
88

24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
90 See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying
text.
91Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 89, at 124.
92 For the text of Article 46(1) of the DRIP, see
supra text accompanying note 20.
93 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 89, at 124. Note that
the United
States initially proposed a different text, which would have read, "The existence of a
sovereign and independent State possessing a representative Government, effectively
functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory, is presumed to satisfy the
principle of equal fights and self-determination as regards these peoples." CASSESE,
supra note 51, at 115 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The U.S. proposal thus
would have gone much further than does the adopted text by explicitly recognizing
the self-determination rights (as embodied in effectively functioning representative
government) of ethnic groups-"distinct peoples"-within a state's territory. However,
the U.S. proposal was vehemently opposed by many developing countries, which argued that it could be used to support secession by ethnic groups. See id. at 115-18.
During the drafting process leading up to the adoption of the savings clause, a
suggestion by Lebanon led to a compromise proposal that-in addition to including a
savings clause-would have read, in relevant part, "States enjoying full sovereignty and
independence, and possessed of a government representing the whole of their population, shall be considered to be conducting themselves in conformity with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as regards that population including
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This clause is important for two reasons. First, it has been interpreted as conferring on racial and religious minorities a right to invoke self-determination as relief from gross discrimination and disenfranchisement.9 4 It is widely agreed that the right to internal selfdetermination exists for such groups as a matter of customary international law,95 especially given extensive state practice with regard to the
institutionalized racism of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. 96 The
modes of exercising internal self-determination in this area center on
the need to create access to government where it has been denied,
and, among other solutions, they contemplate
the granting of exten97
sive autonomy and regional self-government.
Second, the savings clause is important in the sense that it suggests
a right (albeit as a last resort) to exercise external self-determination
in the form of secession by making its prohibition on "dismember[ing] or impair[ing] ... the territorial integrity or political unity"
of states contingent upon states' "compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... without distinction
as to race, creed or colour."9 Where states do not comply with the
principle, all bets are off, at least as far as the plain language of the

the indigenous population" "and without distinction as to race, creed or colour." Id. at
117 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, no records are available that conclusively explain why Lebanon or the Drafting
Committee used language regarding "race, creed or colour" but left out any reference
to indigenous populations. Id. Nevertheless, two tentative conclusions can be drawn.
First, the proposal was designed to narrow the broad array of self-determination rights
for individual groups inherent in the U.S. proposal. See id. Second, the singling out of
"indigenous population" (in response to the "distinct peoples" language of the U.S.
proposal) suggests that indigenous peoples were conceived of as having a right to selfdetermination that would be fulfilled by representative government.
94 See CASSESE, supra note 51, at
120-21.
95 See id. at 120 ("State practice in the UN from the
1970s to the present evidences
that the provision granting internal self-determination to racial groups persecuted by
central government has become part of customary international law.").
96 See id. at 120-21 (citing G.A. Res. 41/101, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/101
(Dec. 4,
1986) (condemning generally the apartheid in South Africa); G.A. Res. 31/154 A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/31/154/A (Dec. 20, 1976) ("[c]ondemning the illegal racist minority regime" in Zimbabwe); S.C. Res. 460, U.N. Doc. S/RES/460 (Dec. 21, 1979) (declaring
that the people of Zimbabwe have an "inalienable ight.., to self-determination, freedom and independence"); S.C. Res. 417, U.N. Doc. S/RES/417 (Oct. 31, 1977)
("[r]eaffirming ... the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the
elimination of apartheidand racial discrimination")).
97 See id. at
124.
98 Declaration on Friendly Relations,
supra note 89, at 124.
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savings clause is concerned.99 This is in sharp contrast to Article 46(1)
of the DRIP, which makes the protection of "territorial integrity" and
"political unity" of states absolute and unconditional.' 10
II. INTERPRETING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS UNDER THE DRIP

As explained in the Introduction, Article 3 of the DRIP explicitly
recognizes-for the first time in international law-the right of indigenous peoples to "self-determination." While the DRIP passed by
an overwhelming margin, objections to this particular provision and
its implications were at the heart of both the "no" votes entered by the
United States and Australia and the countries' conclusion that the
DRIP was "unworkable." 10' This Part begins by briefly reviewing the
pre-DRIP treatment of indigenous peoples' rights under international
law. It then presents a method for reading the rights conferred in the
DRIP in a way that accords with natural language and also takes account of the historical development of the concepts of self-determination and indigenous rights.
A. The Falland Rise of Indigenous Peoples'Rights
Under InternationalLaw
The first treatment of indigenous peoples under international law
coincided, unsurprisingly, with the sixteenth-century European conquest of the Western Hemisphere and followed then-dominant natural law principles. In a series of published lectures, Francisco Vitoria,
a widely recognized founder of international law, concluded that the
indigenous peoples in America had "dominion in both
public
and
••
102
private matters" and thus held legal title over their lands.
He further claimed that discovery alone was insufficient to confer title on the

99

Note, however, that given state practice and extensive opiniojuris, the existence

of customary law supporting even an extremely limited right of oppressed groups to
secede is doubtful. See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 122 ("States have been adamant in
rejecting even the possibility that nations, groups and minorities be granted a right to
secede from the territory in which they live."). But see BUCHHEIT, supra note 88, at 46
(considering possible "'grounds' for the right of separatist self-determination within
international law").
100DRIP, supranote 1, art. 46(1).
101See supra notes 9-34 and accompanying
text.
102 See generally FRANcISCO DE VITORIA, THE FIRST REFLEcTO
ON THE INDIANS
LATELY DISCOVERED (John Pawley Bate trans., 1917) (1696), reprinted inJAMES BROWN
ScoTr, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCIscO DE VITORIA AND His
LAW OF NATIONS app. A, at xiii (1934).
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Europeans "any more than if it had been they who had discovered
us."1 °3 In determining that the indigenous peoples had "the use of
reason"-a requirement for the possession of rights under natural
law-Vitoria noted "method in their affairs," including "polities which
are orderly arranged .... and magistrates, overlords, laws.... and a sys-

tem of exchange." 0 4 Nevertheless, Vitoria concluded that indigenous
peoples were "unfit to found or administer a lawful State up to the
standard required by human and civil claims" because, among other
failures, they had "no proper laws nor magistrates"and Europeans therefore might legitimately "undertake the administration of their country
... , so long as this was clearly for their benefit."'0 5 This theory of ad-

ministration for the benefit of indigenous peoples developed into the
nineteenth-century "trusteeship doctrine," which justified the forced
imposition of full jurisdiction over indigenous peoples for the purpose of civilizing them.'06
U.S. domestic jurisprudence, particularly as developed in two Supreme Court cases, was highly influential in the formation of the trusteeship doctrine. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, Chief Justice John Marshall
called the Indians "fierce savages, whose occupation was war," noting
that "[t]o leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the
country a wilderness." 1 7 Reasoning in part on justiciability grounds,
the Court further concluded that U.S. tide to Indian lands could be
obtained by discovery alone-even though the rule of discovery "may
be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet,
if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been
settled, .

.

. [it] certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice." 1°8

103

Id. app. A, at xxv.

104

Id. app. A, at xiii (emphasis added).

105Id. app. A, at xlv-xlvi (emphasis added).

The distinction between those laws

that were "proper" and those that were not seems to be determined by the extent to
which social organization mirrored the European system. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that "the Indians
could be characterized as 'unfit' because they failed to conform to the European forms
of civilization with which Vitoria was familiar").
106As U.S. Indian Commissioner Nathaniel Taylor wrote in 1868, the United
States, "as the guardian of all the Indians under [its] jurisdiction," had the "most solemn duty to protect and care for, to elevate and civilize them." NATHANIEL G. TAYLOR,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1868), reprinted in part in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 123, 126 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d
ed. 1990).
10721 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
108 Id. at 590-92. Later, in Worcester v. Georgia,Justice Marshall
seemed to revise his
early views on the discovery doctrine, holding that it "regulated the right given by dis-
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Shortly after Johnson, the Supreme Court decided Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Marshall developed what came to be known as the "domestic dependent nations"
doctrine, which views the relationship between tribes and the United
States as "that of a ward to his guardian." '9
While the civilizing mission of the trusteeship doctrine held sway
over the attitude in international law toward indigenous peoples for
all of the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, the modern
human rights movement has forced a rethinking of indigenous peoples' rights in international law. In addition to developing the relationship between self-determination rights and minority rights in
general terms,1 international law has specifically incorporated indigenous rights into two binding treaties.
The first, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries,
Convention No. 107, was promulgated in 1957 to protect indigenous
people's human rights. Among other provisions, it included "special
measures ...for the protection of the institutions, persons, property
and labour of these populations." '
However, after being severely
criticized as "assimilationist" and "anachronistic," the ILO convened a
"Meeting of Experts" in 1986 to review the continued viability of Convention No. 107.112 This group decided that the "integrationist language of Convention No. 107 is outdated, and that the application of
this principle is destructive in the modern world." 113 Instead, they determined that "policies of pluralism, self-sufficiency, self-management
and ethnodevelopment ...would give indigenous populations the

covery among the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man." 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554 (1832). Thus, in
Worcester, the Court seemed to recognize the continued possession of the tribes' inherent natural right to their lands.
109 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 17 (1831).
110 See supra Part I.B (discussing the historical
link between minority rights and
self-determination).
I ILO, Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, International Labour Conference, art. 3, June 26, 1957, No. 107, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 107].
112 SeeANAYA, supra
note 105, at 55-58.
13 Id. at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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best possibilities and means of participating directly
in the formula11 4
tion and implementation of official policies."
Out of this meeting and subsequent work at the ILO, a new binding treaty, Convention No. 169, was created to replace Convention
No. 107.115 The preamble to Convention No. 169 recognizes the "aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over their own
institutions ... within the framework of the States in which they live,"
noting that "their laws, values, [and] customs ...have often been
eroded...6 The definition of "indigenous peoples" in Article 1 of the
Convention, however, notes that the term "peoples" should "not be
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may
attach to the term under international law." 7 By including this language, the ILO made clear that although the Convention's text is
compatible with indigenous self-determination, it does not, and8 cannot, recognize self-determination rights for indigenous peoples.1
The Convention does, however, aim to create the conditions necessary for "self-management" by indigenous peoples, defined with reference to the preamble's call for "control over their own institutions,"
which is apparently synonymous with at least some degree of "selfgovernment."" 9 In particular, Articles 8 and 9 provide significant recognition of indigenous laws, with particular focus on judicial institutions. Article 8 provides that "due regard shall be had to... [indigenous] customary laws" when applying national laws and regulations to

114 Id.
15

(internal quotation marks omitted).
ILO, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent

Countries, June 27, 1989, No. 169, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 169].
116 Id. pmbl.
117 Id. art. 1(3).
118 See ILO, ILO CONVENTION ON INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES, 1989 (No.
169): A MANUAL 9 (2003) [hereinafter ILO MANUAL], available at http://www.ilo.org/
public/libdoc/ilo/2003/103B09_345_engl.pdf ("Convention No. 169 does not place
any limitations on the right to self-determination. It is compatible with any future international instruments which may establish or define such a right.").
119 See id. at 10 (noting that an "important
aim of Convention No. 169 is to set up
the conditions for self-management" and discussing examples of "indigenous selfmanagement" as indicative of "self-government"). Note that the contours of "selfgovernment" have the potential to be significantly varied, such that a limited municipal self-government, like the one being offered to the First Nations in southern Canada, and a highly autonomous regime, like the one described in the proposed Bolivian
constitution, are arguably both examples of "self-government." See infra Part III. Given
Convention No. 169's cautionary note about self-determination and its interpretive
materials, the concept of "self-management" would appear to fall on the limited side of

the "self-government" spectrum.
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indigenous peoples, and guarantees indigenous peoples' "right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system
and with internationally recognised human rights."'2 0 It also requires
states to establish procedures for resolving jurisdictional and other
conflicts that may arise in implementing this right. 2 Article 9 provides that "the methods customarily practised by the peoples concerned for dealing with offences committed by their members shall be
respected," subject to compliance with fundamental national and international human rights norms. 22 Therefore, while the ILO Convention explicitly disavows any recognition of the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples, it also unmistakably recognizes the idea of
"self-government," especially the development of judicial institutions. 23 With this in mind, let us now turn back to the DRIP.
B. A Method for Interpretingthe Rights Conferred Under the DRIP
Like most UN resolutions and declarations relating to human
rights, the DRIP is divided into a preambular section and an operative
section. Though it confers no substantive rights, the preamble is useful for determining the motivations for the Declaration.1 4 Three central ideas stand out from the preamble: (1) concerns about the pres25
ervation of culture and the "right of all peoples to be different"
(echoing the policies of "pluralism, self-sufficiency, self-management
and ethnodevelopment" found in ILO Convention No. 169126); (2)
concerns about advancing equal rights and ending • •discrimination
•
127
(echoing the historical principle of protecting minorities);
and (3)
a desire to advance these rights, including the right to self-determinat-

12
121
122
123

See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 115, art. 8.
Id. art. 8(2).
Id. art. 9(1).
For a thorough treatment of disparity between the the letter and spirit of ILO

Convention No. 169, see Luis RODRiGUEZ-PIIIERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME (1919-1989) 320-31 (2005).
124 The preamble contains a series of clauses beginning
with present or past participles-such as "[g] uided by," "[c ] oncerned," and "[r] ecognizing"-that are indicative
of motivation. See DRIP, supra note 1, pmbl.
125 See DRIP, supra note 1, pmbl.
126 See ANAYA, supra note 105, at 58. For further discussion of the principles developed in ILO Convention No. 169, see supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
17 See DRIP, supra note 1, pmbl. For a review of
the historical link between minority rights and self-determination, see supra Part I.B.
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peoples

and

The operative section of the DRIP contains forty-six articles, most
of which confer substantive rights on indigenous peoples (positive
rights) or place restrictions on state action (negative rights) .129 However, before analyzing those substantive rights, it is important to note
that there are a series of articles that do not confer rights, but rather
serve solely interpretive or implementation-oriented functions. Articles 38 and 41 through 46 fall within these latter two categories.1 3 0 In
the context of self-determination, the most important provision is Article 46(1), prohibiting anything in the DRIP from being "construed
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of
3
'
States."
independent
and
sovereign
As noted in Part I.B.2, this savings clause resembles the savings
clause of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, but with one important distinction: whereas the latter makes its prohibition contingent
upon states' continued fulfillment of a nondiscriminatory representative government, the prohibition in Article 46(1) is absolute. 132 It explicitly states that both external self-determination (i.e., secession)
and any form of internal self-determination that threatens the "territorial integrity or political unity" of states (e.g., autonomy, selfgovernment, or other special measures) are unauthorized by the
DRIP. The substantive rights conferred in the DRIP must be interpreted with these prohibitions in mind.

128
129

See DRIP, supranote 1, pmbl.
For a discussion of the difference between positive and negative rights in the

constitutional setting, see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986), which compares the German constitutional framework,
based largely on positive rights, with the U.S. framework, based largely on negative
rights.
1o See DRIP, supra note 1, arts. 38, 41-46. Article
38 requires states, "in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples," to take "appropriate measures ... to
achieve the ends" of the DRIP. Id. art. 38. In one sense, it is clearly implementation
oriented, in that it explains how (i.e., in "cooperation") states should implement the
DRIP. It may also be interpretation oriented-by calling on states to achieve the ends
of the DRIP in cooperation with indigenous peoples, it could be read to suggest that
the rights in the DRIP are not conferred unilaterally on indigenous peoples.
Id. art. 46(1).
132Compare id. with Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 89,
at 124.
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1. A Trinity of Rights
Unlike the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the DRIP does not place the
right to self-determination in its first article.' 33 Rather, Article 1 of the
DRIP confirms indigenous peoples' "ight to the full enjoyment, as a
collective or as individuals, of all human rights" recognized under international law.'34 Similarly, Article 2 guarantees the "right to be free
from any kind of discrimination." 135 The right to self-determination is
not declared until Article 3. This is not to suggest that the subsequent
placement of the self-determination right in any way diminishes its
importance or its force, but only to note that the first three articlesdistinct from the declared substantive rights that follow-together address the three central ideas of the preamble: 13 6 Article 1 explicitly
recognizes "collective" human rights, advances the "right of all peoples to be different," and addresses the preamble's "ethnodevelopment" concerns by recognizing group rights; Article 2 addresses the
discrimination concerns; and Article 3, when considered in light of
the interpretation-oriented elements of Articles 38 and 46, implicitly
addresses the preamble's "partnership" dimensions. 3 7 Positioning
self-determination immediately after Articles 1 and 2-two articles directed at the protection of minorities-also reminds the reader of the
historical "common object" of self-determination and minority rights
first declared in the Aaland Islands case. 38
Articles 1 through 3 should thus be read together as a trinity of
broad rights focused on the three overarching purposes of the Declaration, whose specifics are elaborated and demarcated in the remaining substantive provisions of the DRIP. In regards to Article 3 selfdetermination, reference to the specific rights subsequently conferred
would follow the interpretation of internal self-determination in the

133

Compare ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 1, and ICESCR, supra note 29, art. 1, with

DRIP, supra note 1, art. 1.
"34 DRIP, supra note
1,art. 1.
135Id. art.

2.

See supra text accompanying notes 124-128.
137 A suggested partnership between indigenous peoples and states is not necessar36

ily apparent from the text of Article 3, nor is it implied by Article 46 standing alone. If
Article 38 is considered an interpretation-oriented provision, see supra note 130, then
perhaps the spirit of "cooperation" and "partnership" is implied in Article 3 self-determination. However, reading Article 3 by itself suggests a unilaterally conferred right:
"Indigenous peoples have the right to ...freely determine their political status
"
DRIP, supra note 1, art. 3 (emphasis added).
138 See supra text accompanying
note 63.
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ICCPR.13 9 Given that Article 46(1) conclusively forecloses external
self-determination, the Article 3 right is necessarily a right to internal
self-determination. Interpreting its specifics using a method similar to
the one used to interpret the ICCPR seems quite "workable" at first
blush.
2. Fleshing Out Article 3
Using the proposed method, in which Article 3 is used as a skeletal foundation that is fleshed out by subsequent Articles, the first and
most important Article to address self-determination is Article 4,
which provides that "[i] ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to
self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous functions."1 4 As a matter of
pure logic, nothing in Article 4 necessarily limits the right of selfdetermination to "autonomy or self-government"; rather, these arrangements are presented
as
examples of the legitimate exercise of
S •
141
internal self-determination.
However, in keeping with the development of internal self-determination,142 on one hand, and indigenous peoples' rights under ILO Convention No. 169,143 on the other,
the right to "autonomy or self-government" is rightly considered to be

See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
supra note 1, art. 4.
141 In explaining its opposition to the
DRIP, the United States conceded that Article 4 "limit[s] the scope" of Article 3, but concluded that it nevertheless could not
support the DRIP. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the UN, supra note 28. This assertion
is odd for two reasons. First, if Article 4 did indeed limit the scope of Article 3 to
.autonomy or self-government," then the U.S. position that Article 3 could support a
concept of "self-government" would seem to require the United States to drop its objections to self-determination (because self-determination would mean nothing more
than "self-government"). Second, the assertion mistakenly seems to rest on the maxim
139

140 DRIP,

expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes all others).

However, that maxim of statutory construction seems inappropriate for Article 4,
where the language "in exercising their right" suggests a broader availability of options. In any case, expressio unius has been heavily criticized by scholars as a logical and
practical fallacy. See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985) (arguing that the canon is "based on the assumption of legislative
omniscience, because it would make sense only if all omissions in legislative drafting
were deliberate"). It has also been rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court at least
once. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983) ("We ...
reject application of the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius.
).
142 See supra Part.I.B.
43 See supra text accompanying notes
115-123.
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at the core of an indigenous right to self-determination.'44 The right
to self-determination thus takes on a distinct and somewhat elaborate
meaning as applied to indigenous peoples when read in conjunction
with subsequent fights elaborating the key features of "autonomy or
self-government""_m ost of which focus on the right to develop and
maintain various indigenous institutions. For example, Article 34
provides that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases
where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards."'146 Thus, while the plain language
of Article 4 does not necessarily restrict the scope of the right conferred in Article 3, the provisions relating to self-determination, especially those relating to indigenous institutions, together suggest a limiting force.
In summary, the Article 3 right of self-determination, a right to internal self-determination, should be interpreted in the same way internal self-determination has been interpreted in the ICCPR-as defined and delimited by the specific rights to which it most closely
relates. 14 Under the DRIP, this argues for a two-stage process, moving

144 In addition to "autonomy or self-government"
and the particular rights that
accompany it,
the exercise of internal self-determination could include, for example,
an extensive affirmative action program to increase the representation of indigenous
populations that have been historically discriminated against. This kind of a program
would accord with the application of internal self-determination to racial and religious
groups under the Declaration on Friendly Relations. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
145 The most important self-determination rights fleshed out
by the DRIP include
the rights to "maintain and strengthen ... distinct political, legal, economic, social and
cultural institutions" (Article 5); "establish and control their educational systems and
institutions" (Article 14); "participate in decision-making in matters which would affect
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their
own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decisionmaking institutions" (Article 18); "maintain and develop their political, economic and
social systems or institutions" (Article 20); control "the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned" (Article 26); "determine and develop priorities
and strategies for the development or use of their lands" (Article 32); "determine their
own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions" (Article
33); and "promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures... and, in cases
where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human
rights standards" (Article 34). DRIP, supra note 1, arts. 5, 14, 18, 20, 26 & 32-34.
14 Id. art. 34 (emphasis added).
147In the case of the ICCPR, the specific rights giving meaning to internal selfdetermination are those that assure the exercise of "authentic self-government" for the
whole population of a state. See CASSESE, supra note 51, at 101. Likewise, in the case of
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first from Article 3 to Article 4 for the core meaning of self-determination ("autonomy or self-government"), and then from Article 4 to
the specific provisions of the DRIP that elaborate the right of selfgovernment in the form of indigenous institutions. As in the ICCPR,
a state's compliance with these specific provisions serves as a proxy for
determining its compliance with the overarching self-determination
norm.148 This interpretive method has two principal advantages over a
method that instead attempts to read self-determination as a right
broader than the specific provisions that give it life. First, the proposed method makes it much easier for states to evaluate their compliance with the self-determination right. They can, in a sense, use
the specific provisions as a kind of checklist; if they have complied
with all of the specific requirements, they can be confident that they
have complied with the overall right. Second, the method also benefits indigenous peoples seeking to claim violations of their self-determination rights by giving them specific frames of reference in which
to raise claims of rights violations.
However, while this process moves the reader from generality to
specifics, in some ways it merely shifts the fundamental inquiry onto
the specific provision at issue. The task still remains of applying a particular case or scenario (that is, a proposed or actual exercise of selfdetermination) to the most relevant specific provision. As with the
application of any particular case to a general principle, difficult, factintensive questions will remain. However, the argument here is that
the resolution of the particular case will be easier within the confines
of the specific provision. Under such an approach, one that accords
with a natural reading of the DRIP in the context of international legal history, the DRIP should be149"workable," despite the concerns of
the United States and Australia.
To test this thesis, we now examine Article 34 as a specific elaboration of Article 3, and the application of Article 34 to an emerging concept of EJP that has appeared in the new draft constitution of Bolivia.

the DRIP, the specific rights that give meaning to self-determination are those that assure such self-government for the indigenous peoples within a state. However, because
the means of securing self-government for a whole population differ from the means
of securing self-government for a subnational group, see id. at 102-08, the particular
contours of the right to internal self-determination look different under the ICCPR
and the DRIP.
148 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting
that internal self-determination in the ICCPR has historically been measured with reference to other substantive
rights conferred in the treaty).
149 See supra notes 18, 34, and accompanying text.
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III. EGALITARIANJURIDICAL PLURALISM: A TEST CASE
While international law regarding indigenous peoples has slowly
developed over the last half century," 0 regional and national indigenous movements have gained significant sway in various parts of the
world. " Perhaps the most notable example in current international
affairs is Bolivia, where sixty-two percent of people aged fifteen years
and older identify themselves as indigenous." 52 The country elected its
first indigenous president in 2005 and is currently rewriting its constitution, in which one of the most important and contentious goals is
redress for the subjugation of the indigenous majority. 153 In particular, the Bolivian Constitutional Assembly has redesigned the justice
system to include notjust one judiciary but two-that is, in addition to
traditional "ordinary justice" based on the civil law, the proposed constitution contemplates a "community justice" system, or indigenous
judiciary, which would apply indigenous law and custom."54 On November 24, 2007, the Constitutional Assembly approved the entire
draft text of the new constitution, 155 though final approval and enactment are still forthcoming.
A. EgalitarianJuridicalPluralismin Context
The constitutionalization of an indigenous judiciary is part of a
larger movement for greater self-government among the indigenous
peoples of Bolivia, a movement that is fundamentally interconnected
150

See supra Part II.A.

151 See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:

A LIBERAL THEORY

OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).

Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Reptiblica de Bolivia [National Statistical
Institute of Bolivia], 2001 Censo de Poblaci6n y Vivienda [2001 Census of Population
and Housing], http://www.ine.gov.bo/cgi-bin/Redatam/RG4WebEngine.exe/Dicdonar?&
BASE=TallCreac&ITEM=DEMOG26&MAIN=WebServerMain.inl.
See Bolivia Opposition Calls Strike, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7114506.stm ("The president has made rewriting the
constitution a key part of his reform agenda to give the indigenous majority greater
political power but the issue has deepened regional and ethnic divisions in the country.").
152

See COMIsIONJUDICIAL, ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE DE BOLIVIA [JUDICIAL
COMMISSION, CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BOLIVIA], INFORME DE LA SUBCOMISI6N DE
JUSTICIA COMUNITARIA [REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMISSION FOR COMMUNITY JUSTICE] 9
(2007) [hereinafter SUBCOMMISSION REPORT] (on file with author) (describing the

communityjustice system).
155ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENT'E DE BOLIVIA [CONSTITUTIONAL
ASSEMBLY OF BoLIVIA], NUEVA CONSTITUCI6N POLTICA DEL ESTADO [NEW POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE] (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter DRAFT CONSTITUTION], available at http://
www.laconstituyente.org/files/Libros/nuevacpebolivia.pdf.
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with the development of democracy in Bolivia's history. After living
under conditions of forced labor from the Spanish conquest in the
sixteenth century and through the latifundio system of the first 120plus years of republicanism,15' a 1952 revolution included agrarian reform that gave some land back to indigenous peasants. 157 However,
this reform was not comprehensive, geographically or substantively: 158
huge portions of the country's indigenous population were unaffected
and the beneficiaries remained subject to deeply rooted political and
economic discrimination. 59
In 1994, after decades of more or less organized pressure from indigenous peoples and nongovernmental organizations, the government instituted a number of important constitutional and legislative
reforms with respect to indigenous peoples. In addition to broader
changes-including the recognition of Bolivia as a multiethnic and
pluricultural state, 16 0 the inclusion of indigenous peoples in newly decentralized municipal development decisions, 16 1 and the recognition
162
of collective ownership of some lands -the 1994 constitutional reforms included a limited recognition of indigenous laws and customs

156 The latifundio system involved the expropriation of indigenous lands and the

creation of large estates on which the indigenous population served as feudal labor for
white or mestizo landowners. See HERBERT S. KLEIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BOLIVIA
209-10 (2003) (noting that "[t]hrough the constant expansion of the [latifundio] system, land distribution [in Bolivia] had become one of the most unjust in Latin America," with six percent of landowners controlling ninety-two percent of the cultivated
land by the time of the 1952 revolution).
157 See id. at 214-15 (explaining how peasant mobilization
forced the regime to create the Agrarian Reform Commission).
158 In particular, the agrarian reform was focused on the altiplano in the west and
left intact the old system in Santa Cruz and other lowlands regions to the east. See id. at
215 (noting that Santa Cruz and some other medium-sized hacienda regions were excepted from the reform).
159 NANCY GREY POSTERO, NOW WE ARE CITIZENS: INDIGENOUS
POLITICS IN POSTMULTICULTURAL BOLIVIA 4 (2007).
160 CONSTITUcION POLTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA DE 1967
CON REFORMAS
DE 1994 Y TEXTO CONCORDADO DE 1995 [CONSTITUTION OF BOLIVIA OF 1967 WITH
1994 REFORMS AND 1995 AGREED TEXT] art. 1.
161 Participaci6n Popular [Popular Participation], Ley No. 1551 (Apr.
20, 1994)
(Bol.), available at http://www2.minedu.gov.bo/pre/ley/ley551.pdf.
162 Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria [National Service for Agrarian Reform],
Ley No. 1715 (Oct. 18, 1996) (Bol.), available at http://www.inra.gov.bo/portalv2/
Uploads/Normas/leyl715.pdf.
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as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, so long as those laws
and customs were not contrary to the constitution or other laws. 1"3
Thus, while the 1994 constitution recognizes the possibility of
functioning indigenous courts applying indigenous law, it grants no
significantjurisdictional authority to such courts, whose processes may
only be used in the "alternative" (assuming full consent of all parties)
and whose decisions may be appealed and overturned by any court of
ordinary jurisdiction. 6 4 This model is mirrored, in large part, in the
constitutions of a number of other Latin American states with large
indigenous populations. 165

By contrast, the new constitution contemplates a system of EJP
where the indigenous judiciary will be on equal footing with the ordinary civil law judiciary, with exclusive and authoritative jurisdiction
granted to the courts of each in their respective territories. 166Jurisdictional conflicts (as well as alleged violations by indigenous courts of
fundamental rights) will be resolved by a Plurinational Constitutional
Tribunal-the court of last instance for constitutional questionscomposed of both indigenous and civil law judges interpreting fundamental rights. 167 Such an extensive grant of judicial autonomy for
indigenous peoples is unprecedented anywhere in the world.'68 Taking note of its essential characteristics, EJP can be roughly defined in
the indigenous context as a system of two exclusive and hierarchically
equal judicial organs (one indigenous and one nonindigenous) that

163 CONsTITUcION POUTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA
DE 1967 CON REFORMAS

DE 1994 Y TEXTO CONCORDADO DE 1995 [CONSTITUTION OF BOLIVIA OF 1967 wrrH
1994 REFORMS AND 1995 AGREED TEXT] art. 171.
164 Id.
165 See Elva Terceros CurIlar, Derecho Indigena en la Legislaci6n [Indigenous Law in
Legislation], in SISTEMA JURiDICO INDiGENA [INDIGENOUS JURIDICAL SYSTEM] 35, 44-46

(Centro de EstudiosJuridicos e Investigaci6n Social ed., 2003) (comparing the existing
Bolivian system to the constitutional systems of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay,
and Venezuela).
1W See DRAFr CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, pt. 2, tit. III (defining as separate
and
exclusive jurisdictional authorities the courts of ordinary justice and those of indigenous justice).
167 Id. arts. 203, 206, 212.
168To contrast with just one example, tribal courts
in the U.S. system are not constitutionally mandated; rather, they are created under the auspices of Congress's Article I powers and are thus akin to administrative courts. Any decisions by U.S. tribal
courts can be overturned by a simple act of Congress. See Catherine T. Struve, Tribal
Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 137 (2004) ("[T]he Supreme Court
has stripped tribes of many of the positive aspects of governmental authority[, including] key aspects of legislative and adjudicative authority ... ."); id. at 145 (discussing
"Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes").
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together cover the entire jurisdiction of a state, with jurisdictional
conflicts subject to review only by a court of last instance employing an
affirmative action program that mandates the presence of authorities
representing each organ.
B. Is EgalitarianJuridicalPluralisman
"Appropriate"Exercise of Article 34 ?
Despite their handicaps under the 1994 constitution, there is
strong evidence that Bolivian indigenous communities and their
members heavily utilize and rely on indigenous laws and courts." 9 In
describing their preference for taking cases to indigenous courts
rather than ordinary courts, indigenous representatives cite several
reasons: (1) cultural acceptance-indigenous law is "based on ancestral values"; (2) transparency-it is "public justice in the presence of
the people"; (3) accessibility-it is "oral and free of cost ....
an act of
service [by judges]"; (4) efficiency-it is "speedy and free from corruption"; and (5) theory ofjustice-it is "preventative and restorative,"
as opposed to retributive." 7
The relative inaccessibility of the ordinary justice system also explains why indigenous authorities are asked to resolve disputes among
their members. Of Bolivia's 326 municipalities, the ordinary justice
system only has courts to cover 130, or less than forty percent; rural
areas, and thus indigenous peoples, are the hardest hit by this dearth
of civil lawjudges."7' As a result, indigenous law is often the only realistic option for indigenous persons seeking judicial relief. Because
indigenous judges do not accept payment for their services, 172 the fortification and institutionalization of indigenous courts present a relatively low-cost solution to the problem of inadequate access to justice-a solution that
is more broadly understood and embraced by the
73
population served. 1

169See generally SISTEMAJURIDICA INDiGENA, supra note 165 (studying the practice
of indigenous justice in the western Amazon region of the country); MARCELO
FERNANDEZ OSCO, LA LEY DEL AYULLU [THE LAW OF THE AYULLU] (2000) (studying the
practice of indigenous justice in the eastern altiplano region).
170 SUBCOMMISSION REPORT,

supra note

154, at 24.

Comisi6n Judicial, Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia [Judicial Commission,
Constitutional Assembly of Bolivia], Diagn6stico de laJusticia Ordinaria [Diagnosis of
OrdinaryJustice], at slide 9 (2007) (on file with author).
172 SUBCOMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at
24.
173 See, e.g., Elba Flores Gonzales, Chiquitanos: Monte Verde y Lomerio,
in SISTEMA
171

JURiDICA INDIGENA, supra note 165, at 57, 143 (noting that indigenous communities in
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. However, is a strengthened indigenous judiciary in the form of
EJP an appropriate exercise of the Article 34 "right to promote, develop and maintain ... juridical systems" and, therefore, of the Article
3 right to self-determination? First, it should be noted that Bolivia is
in the process of voluntarily developing its indigenous courts within
the framework of a constitutional assembly. No international organization, let alone tribunal, is requiring this process, and because the
concept is in its nascent stage, it would be extremely hard to argue
that EJP is a binding rule of customary international law.14 However,
its implementation in Bolivia would count as state practice 7with opinio
juris for the formation of a future binding customary rule. 1
It is likewise difficult to argue that EJP, as defined in Part III.A, is
required under Article 34. Article 34 gives the right to develop and
maintain 'juridical systems," but nowhere does it suggest that such systems must be of an equivalent rank with ordinary state courts. While
it is possible to argue that a right to EJP exists under Article 34 when
considered in conjunction with the Article 4 "right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs,"1 6 EJP as defined and elaborated in the draft constitution gives
indigenous courts exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising within
their territory. It would perhaps be a stretch to suggest that a dispute
between a multinational corporation accused of dumping oil on indigenous lands and an indigenous people is an "internal or local
affair[ ."'77

the Chiquitos region of Bolivia have traditionally resolved disputes internally because
of custom, unfamiliarity with civil justice systems, and hostility from civil authorities).
174 One could possibly argue, however, that the general
Article 34 right to develop
juridical systems-though not requiring EJP per se-has crystallized as instant customary international law given the opinio juris of 144 states who voted for the DRIP. See
Cheng, supra note 8, at 532 ("[01piniojuriscan arise or change instantaneously.").
175 In developing EJP, the Constitutional Assembly has made specific
reference to
its existing international legal obligations under ILO Convention No. 169; while EJP
probably is not required by Convention No. 169, Bolivia's belief that it is required
counts as opiniojuris. See SUBCOMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 11-12 (noting
the international law foundation for EJP).
176 DRIP, supra note 1, art. 4.
177 Id. The grant of jurisdiction under the draft Bolivian
constitution is exclusive
and territorial, and thus-absent constitutional jurisprudence to the contrary--seems
to contemplate a grant of exclusive jurisdiction over such a case to indigenous courts.
See DRAFr CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, art. 192 (giving indigenous courts expansive
subject-matter jurisdiction over legal relationships and violations of rights within their
territory); id. (allowing indigenous courts to make nonreviewable decisions regarding
which cases they will hear).
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However, that Article 34 does not require all the features of EJP
does not mean that EJP is an inappropriate exercise of Article 34. Article 43 declares that the rights it recognizes "constitute the minimum
standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous
peoples of the world."' 7 8 Given the process of the constitutional assembly, which involved extensive representatives of indigenous peoples,'7 9 Bolivia appears to be acting in accordance with its Article 38
obligations to "achieve the ends of [the DRIP]," ' including the Article 43 development of rights beyond the "minimum standards"8
through "consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples."' '
In this sense, the Declaration appears to contemplate a kind of "states
as laboratories" approach in international law to further the development of indigenous rights. 18 There is nothing inherently inappropriate in, and indeed much to be gained from, a state implementing a
novel constitutional system that serves as an experiment to be adopted
by other states if successful.
C. Indigenous Courts, EgalitarianJuridicalPluralism,and the
Objections Registered by the Opposing States
The method of interpreting the DRIP proposed herein accords
with the historical development of the rights and the structure of the
Declaration, but how does it respond to the objections registered by
the United States and Australia in opposing the DRIP? First, on the
specific question of indigenous courts, Australia stated in its voting
explanation that it was "concerned that the declaration places indigenous customary law in a superior position to national law. Customary
law is not law in the sense that modern democracies use the term; it is
based on culture and tradition."'8' 3 Given the foregoing analysis of Article 34, this objection can be dispatched with relative ease: Article 34
178

DRIP, supra note 1, art. 43.

179See POSTERO, supra note 159, at 2-3, 17 (noting extensive interest of
indigenous

groups in participating in the constitutional assembly).
180DRIP, supra note 1, art. 38.
181 Id. art. 43.
182 For an explanation of this approach in U.S. domestic law, see Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One of federalism's chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
183 U.N. GAOR, supra note 8, at 12 (statement
of Ambassador Robert Hill, Permanent Representative of Australia).
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does not require states to accord indigenous customary law and courts
a level of jurisdictional hierarchy even equivalent to that of national
law, let alone superiorto it. '""
Turning to the more central objection to the right of self-determination, it is worth briefly reviewing changes to the stated position of
the United States vis-A-vis the DRIP during the last two years. Recall
that the U.S. voting explanation on September 13, 2007, declared that
it was the mandate of the Working Group to "articulate a new concept, i.e. self-government within the nation state" and not to expand
on the right of self-determination contained in Article 1 of the
ICCPR. 185 As a matter of pure fact, it was explicitly within the mandate
of the Working Group to use the concept of "self-determination," albeit not to expand the right under Article 1.186
In any event, while its September 13 position embraced "selfgovernment" but rejected "self-determination," the United States took
a different tack in a statement made to the UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues on May 17, 2004. At that time, it stated, "Over one
hundred years ago the United States was in conflict with the Native
Peoples of America. In the hundred years since, the United States has
adopted various policies-from assimilation to the termination of
tribal status to the current era of self-determination." s7 In describing the
"current era of self-determination," the United States noted that it
had a "government-to-government relationship" with tribes' and specifically addressed its hopes for the DRIP:
The Declaration should recognize that local authorities should be free to
make their own decisions on a range of issues from taxation to education
to land resources management to membership. These are the powers of a
government. This
is the essence of a federal system with which we are quite
89
comfortable.

1

See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text. In addition, the contention
that "customary law is not law," whether true or not, is not only somewhat irrelevant,
but also reminiscent of Francisco Vitoria's questionable conclusion that while the Indians had "laws" and "magistrates," they had "no proper laws nor magistrates." See supra
notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
:85 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
s 8 See supra note 33.
184

187

Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Statement on Indigenous Issues

Agenda Item on Human Rights, to the Third Session of the Permanent Forum (May
17, 2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/

press-releases/20040517_083.html.
188
189

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The United States used the term "self-determination" but was clearly
referring to only one component of that term: internal self-determination. In a 2001 position on indigenous peoples, the U.S. National
Security Council authorized U.S. representatives to promote "internal
self-determination" as the concept to be articulated in the DRIP,' 9
and that continued to be the U.S. position during the first half of the
decade.
The reasons for the decision to move away from supporting selfdetermination are unclear, but the change in U.S. position illustrates
its use of three different terms to describe the right to be conferred in
the DRIP: "self-government," "internal self-determination," and "selfdetermination." While Australia and the United States made much of
the distinction between "self-government" and "self-determination" on
September 13, 2007, the U.S. statement to the UN on May 17, 2004,
seems to use these two concepts interchangeably. And, indeed, under
the DRIP, all three terms should be considered virtually synonymous.
Self-determination under the DRIP means "internal self-determination" when read in conjunction with Article 46, and "self-government,"
articulated in Article 4, is the core of the "self-determination."
This is not to suggest that the United States and Australia might
not have at least colorable arguments for opposing the DRIP's grant
of internal self-determination.
After all, given the interpretive
method suggested here, "internal self-determination" includes a concept of "self-government" that-while not supporting secessionguarantees substantive control over "lands, territories and resources,"' 9' in addition to the power to create and manage a number
of political and legal institutions. Even if those institutions are not entirely, or even significantly, removed from the supervision of the state,
the grant of land rights, including compensation for stolen lands, certainly presents a real cost (to the extent the aspirational principles are
implemented) to states who sign the DRIP. However, by resting on an
untenable opposition to self-determination qua self-determinationand without distinguishing between the external and internal varieties-the United States and Australia avoid the important debate
about the precise contours of the "internal self-determination"
granted by the DRIP.

190 U.S. Nat'l Sec. Council, Position on Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 18, 2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/indigenousdoc.html.
191 DRIP, supra note 1, art. 26(3).
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CONCLUSION

The objections to the "workability" of the DRIP registered by the
United States and Australia out of concerns about self-determination
are mistaken and should be withdrawn. While there may be other legitimate reasons for opposing the DRIP, any opposition should not be
based on an avoidable misreading of the concept. The method proposed here accords with both the historical development of self-determination and the structural design of the DRIP. It provides a workable framework for both states and indigenous peoples seeking to
advance their collective rights, especially in developing and maintaining key institutions of self-government, courts foremost among them.
Though individual states like Bolivia are free to experiment and develop indigenous courts and other institutions as they see fit, a general
agreement, currently impeded principally by the opposition of four
states, would make the DRIP an effective instrument
and truly "a tri192
umph for indigenous peoples around the world."

192

See Press Release, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., supra note 3.

